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Discussant's Response to 
A Look at the Record on Auditor Detection 
of Management Fraud 
Robert L. Grinaker 
University of Houston 
I am pleased to review Donald Ziegler's paper on " A Look at the Record on 
Auditor Detection of Management Fraud.'' As chairman of The Standing Sub-
committee on Methods of Perpetration and Detection of Fraud, Ziegler speaks 
from a position of considerable knowledge, and his paper reflects the significant 
work of that subcommittee. Because I challenge only a point or two in the paper, I 
have chosen to emphasize and expand several of the points raised. Hence, I would 
like my remarks to be viewed as complementary to those of M r . Ziegler. 
The matters I have selected for emphasis are the following: 
1. M y understanding of the meaning of ''management fraud.'' 
2. The materiality threshhold for fraud. 
3. The relationship of internal control to management fraud. 
4. Ziegler's four-point program for fraud detection. 
5. Management fraud and implications for research. 
The Meaning of Management Fraud 
Because "management fraud" contains the adjective "management," the 
term is meant to be distinguished from fraud in general. While all fraud involves 
deceit, trickery, or cheating, management fraud connotes special characteristics. 
In my judgment, management fraud contains three special characteristics as 
follows: 
1. The fraud is perpetrated at levels of management above those to which 
internal control systems generally relate. 
2. The fraud frequently involves using the financial statements to create 
an illusion that an entity is more healthy and prosperous than it actu-
ally is. 
3. If the fraud involves the misappropriation of assets, it frequently is 
shrouded in a maze of complex transactions often involving related 
third parties. 
ASB (Auditing Standards Board), in its discussion of limitations on the effec-
tiveness of internal control, makes the point that controls can be overriden by cer-
tain levels of management. In SAS Section 320.34, ASB states as follows: 
procedures designed to assure the execution and recording of transactions may be 
ineffective against either errors or irregularities perpetrated by management with 
respect to transactions or to the estimates and judgments required in the prepara-
tion of financial statements." ASB reaffirms the point in SAS Section 327.09 in 
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which it states: " . . . management can perpetrate irregularities by overriding con-
trols that would prevent similar irregularities by other employees.'' The implica-
tions for auditing appear clear. Whenever the auditor sets about to test for 
management fraud, little, if any, reliance can be placed on internal control. 
When financial statements are used to create an illusion, the input data usu-
ally is manipulated to include false or questionable transactions or to include false 
or questionable judgments with respect to expense allocations or revenue recogni-
tion. The incentive for such deceit may be (1) to stave off creditors, (2) to raise in-
vestment capital at a cheaper cost than justified, or (3) to provide for subtle misap-
propriation of assets. With respect to the latter point, the financial statements may 
be manipulated to increase EPS for the purpose of enhancing the value of share op-
tions or management bonuses. 
If management fraud involves the misappropriation of assets, it frequently is 
the case that the fraud is covered by overstated assets just like McKesson-Robbins 
and its fictitious receivables and inventory. Almost, but not quite. Today the 
McKesson-Robbins type coverup would be caught by the auditor through ac-
counts receivable confirmation or inventory observation. Hence, the coverup fre-
quently involves complex transactions often involving related third parties. This 
has made it possible either to confound the auditor or to provide some evidence of 
bona fides. 
Hopefully, consideration of the characteristics of management fraud will help 
place in perspective the audit risks involved. 
Materiality Threshhold for Fraud 
Ziegler's point is well taken with respect to differing perceptions of the 
auditor's responsibility for fraud detection. Although the SEC may not believe 
that the auditor should be held responsible for A L L management fraud, it cer-
tainly appears that the materiality threshhold is lower than for other types of er-
rors. For example, the Commission's final rules on application of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act have been criticized for omitting materiality standards. Perhaps 
some small comfort can be taken from the following quote in the release (Section 
34-15570—February, 1979): 
The SEC believes that the concern expressed with respect to inadvertent 
and inconsequential errors is unwarranted. The statute does not require 
perfection, but only that the books, records, and accounts "in reasonable 
detail, accurately and fairly reflect transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of the issuer.'' 
I say small comfort when I read Commissioner John Evans' response to criticism 
for omission of the materiality standard (The Week in Review, Delotte Haskins & 
Sells, November 30, 1979): 
I do not expect to see a positive response in any Commission action at this 
time. Congress determined not to include the materiality concept in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and for the Commission to engraft it now 
through a management report requirement could obfuscate that point. 
Moreover, it might lessen the sensitivity of all of us to what the Act re-
quires. 
Although I completely agree with Ziegler that the appropriate degree of audit 
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responsibility for fraud detection should be limited to those frauds having a 
material impact on financial statements, and although ASB (SAS Section 
327.05), clearly makes this point (clarifying ambiguities contained in SAS#1 Sec-
tion 110.05 08), it now appears that public expectations may have overridden the 
profession's attempt to establish clear and reasonable limits of responsibility. 
Hence, I am considerably less optimistic than is Mr . Ziegler that a G A A S audit 
will be sufficient defense with respect to undetected management fraud. In fact, I 
believe the profession must face the necessity (1) of distinguishing between finan-
cial statement errors involving bona fides of transactions or account balances and 
(2) those involving unintentional mistakes or poor judgment and for developing 
auditing standards applicable to each type of error. Perhaps reasonable standards 
would call for auditing in a fraud mode1 only if indicated by appropriate warning 
signals. Several lists of such signals exist, but I would commend the listing 
prepared by the Ziegler subcommittee and published in The CPA Letter (AICPA, 
March 12, 1974, P 4). 
The Relationship of Internal Control to Management Fraud 
For purposes of discussion, I have assumed that management frauds are 
perpetrated at levels of management above those for which internal controls 
systems generally are designed to be effective. Thus, if as a consequence of warn-
ing flags, the auditor chooses to test for management fraud, all tests must be 
substantive and no reliance can be placed on the system of internal control. 
In preparing my remarks, I reviewed a number of the SEC's Accounting 
Series Releases (ASR's) in which the Commission has chosen to spell out the 
details of cases purported to involve auditing deficiencies.2 A number of these 
cases indicated that the auditor placed inappropriate reliance on the client's inter-
nal controls. However, inappropriateness was often related to weak controls. This 
criticism is unfortunate. It misses the point that, with respect to management 
fraud, control systems are irrelevant. In my judgment, the criticisms should have 
taken the form that the circumstances called for auditing in the fraud mode and, 
hence, no reliance should have been placed on the control system. The point is il-
lustrated by ASR #209, in which the Commission states in its conclusion the 
following: 
When confronted with evidence that an audit client's internal accounting 
controls are unreliable, independent auditors should employ detailed ex-
panded procedures and insist upon obtaining evidential matter from exter-
nal sources. In this instance, (the auditor) . . . improperly relied upon the 
accounting data developed by Tidal. . . . 
In my judgment, the conclusion may lead to the unwarranted implication that, 
had the controls been strong, the auditor could more properly have relied on the 
accounting data developed by management. The fact is that the frauds were 
perpetrated by levels of management high enough to override even a strong con-
trol system. 
Nevertheless, while it currently is inappropriate to rely on internal control 
when auditing in a fraud mode, because of severe responsibilities imposed on 
auditors for the detection of management fraud, consideration should be given to 
whether control standards can effectively be imposed on higher levels of manage-
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ment than are currently contemplated. It may be feasible, for example, to carry 
the concept of "separation of duties" to higher levels. Thus, the generally 
recognized functions of general auditor, operations, treasurer, and controller 
might remain separated and independent to a level even as high as the board of 
directors. 
The feasibility of the foregoing suggestion is at least indicated by data gathered 
for as yet unpublished research. Among a sample of the companies in the Fortune 
500, 17% of the general auditors reported to a member of the board of directors 
in 1980 as compared to 9% in 1976. Whether raising reporting levels would be 
effective in deterring management fraud is a question best left to either experience 
or research. In any event, in my judgment, the matter deserves serious considera-
tion. 
Ziegler's Four-Point Program For Fraud Detection 
In this section, I am going to challenge another of Mr . Ziegler's conclusions. 
He lists a four-point program for which he sort of apologizes for whether it is too 
simple and not sufficiently enlightening. In my judgment, that program is quite 
enlightening and is made elegant by its simplicity. In order to add emphasis to the 
points made, I have taken the liberty of repeating the list: 
1. Watch out for overstated assets and understated liabilities. 
2. Be wary of related party transactions. 
3. Pay particular attention to large complex transactions. 
4. Get to know your client, his business and his industry before you 
report on his financial statements. 
I would like to address these items in more detail and I will begin with the last one. 
Every treatise on epistomology contains the admonition that the conduct of in-
quiry requires thorough knowledge by the investigator of the matter under in-
vestigation. Kerlinger states as follows: 
If one wants to solve a problem one must generally know what the prob-
lem is. It can be said that a large part of the solution lies in knowing what it 
is one is trying to do.3 
Cohen and Nagel make the point when they discuss the relevance of hypotheses: 
In the absence of knowledge concerning a subject matter, we can make no 
well-founded judgment of relevance. It follows that valuable suggestions 
for solving a problem can be made only by those who are familiar with the 
kinds of connections which the subject matter under investigation is 
capable of exhibiting.4 
I assert that the prior knowledge required of the auditor is, at the absolute 
minimum, a thorough knowledge of the client's business and the client's in-
dustry. For example, the question of inventory obsolescence and how to test for it 
would be very different for a retailer as compared to an airplane manufacturer. M y 
ability to design (and, yes, to carry out) the appropriate test would depend on my 
knowledge of each client and each industry. 
Why am I belaboring such an obvious point? In the ASR's I selected for 
review, over and over again, the point is made by the Commission that the auditor 
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simply did not understand the client's business. Examples are contained in the 
following quotes: 
ASR #173: . . . the auditors accepted assertions by management concern-
ing the special circumstances of the business involved although 
presentation of the supposed results presented unusual accounting and 
auditing problems. In considerable measure this occurred because the 
auditors were not sufficiently familiar with the business context to 
assess the representations of management. 
ASR #227: The Commission has previously addressed the audit con-
siderations inherent in having a thorough familiarity with the transac-
tions being audited. 
ASR #241: The senior accountant assigned to the engagement has no 
prior experience in auditing broker-dealers and was not provided with 
an audit program containing specific procedures designed for broker-
dealers. 
In my judgment, prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is so fundamental 
to audit inquiry that steps should be taken to assure that such knowledge pervades 
the entire audit team. I wonder how many staff training programs are directed to 
specific industries and specific clients. I assert that inclusion of such programs in 
the training budgets of accounting firms would be cost-beneficial. 
Consider now the question of related party transactions. These are specifically 
covered by ASB in SAS#6 issued in July 1975. A number of the audit failures in 
the SEC-described cases were attributable, at least in part, to insufficient attention 
given to the propriety of such transactions. I counted six references to related 
party transaction with the following quote being typical: 
ASR #227: When one party to a transaction is able to influence the 
operating policies of another party, the risk of the transaction lacking a 
legitimate business purpose rises substantially. In this regard, the 
auditors should have intimate familiarity with the business of the 
client in order to understand the opportunities which may exist for 
such transactions. 
Careful application of SAS #6 should materially reduce the likelihood that those 
frauds involving related party transactions would go undetected. 
Many of the SEC described cases involved large complex transactions. These 
transactions appear to have been conceived either to have created the illusion of 
legitimacy or simply to confound the auditor. The essence of the SEC criticism in 
these cases is that the auditor simply accepted management's representations 
regarding the underlying events rather than to dig down and obtain the necessary 
confirming evidence. Frankly, I am somewhat sympathetic with the poor auditors 
on these engagements. For example, Penn Central (ASR#173) involved almost at 
the same time not one but eight transactions each of which seemed to me to be 
truly mind-boggling. In one year, Tidal Marine International (ASR 209) involved 
five equally mind-boggling transactions. 
In one of the Tidal Marine transactions, the auditor was attempting to test the 
collectibility of a receivable from a company named Transoceanic for 
$1,082,058. In order to satisfy the auditor concerning the collectability of this 
receivable which had been created from a fictitious revenue transaction, Tidal's 
management furnished to the auditor an agreement and release involving four af-
filiated companies. The agreement recited that Tidal owed Barclay at least 
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$1,082,058, that Barclay owed Panocean $1,094,472, that Panocean owed 
Transoceanic $1,252,058, and Transoceanic owed Tidal $1,082,058. With cer-
tain adjusting payments all of the indebtedness was extinguished and the auditor 
now had evidence of a collectible receivable. 
Transactions of comparable complexity were found in five other cases. It also 
is interesting to note that many of the highly complex transactions used to deceive 
the auditor also involved related parties. Thus, the combination appears to be 
quite devastating with respect to the audit risk of undetected management fraud. 
It also is interesting to note that virtually every case detailed by the SEC in-
volved financial statements with either overstated assets or understated liabilities.5 
Overstated assets were either fictitious or overvalued. In many cases, the 
misstatements either were created or shrouded over by complex related-party 
transactions. Most of the other cases seemed to involve front-ended revenues, 
capitalized expenses, and unrecognized liabilities. I hope all of this indicates a con-
tinuing role for the balance-sheet audit, which I am sometimes led to believe is on 
the endangered species list. I hope not. Because, given the fact that management 
fraud is beyond the scope of internal controls as currently conceived, the balance 
sheet audit should continue to have a significant role in the audit process. 
Management Fraud and Implications For Research 
I share Don Ziegler's disappointment with the difficulty of obtaining indepth 
analyses of fraud cases and auditing procedures which have proven effective in 
either revealing or thwarting fraud. I would guess that the difficulty stems, not 
only from the concern for the legal implications, but also the reluctance of people 
to put in the many hours of work required. Any academic in the room can attest 
to the meticulous planning and arranging that must be made to get adequate 
responses to a questionnaire of even modest length or to get persons to serve as ex-
perimental subjects. In my judgment, the information being sought by the Ziegler 
subcommittee would have to be packaged up and be presented to and be 
"blessed'' by the executive committee of every participating accounting firm. 
Management fraud also should be a fruitful field for academic research. The 
work of Albrecht and Romney (including their paper to be discussed in the next 
session) is particularly encouraging in this respect. 
I will be so presumptuous as to list two or three other possibilities: 
1. Design and test the effectiveness of internal controls directed to top 
management. 
2. Design simulated frauds to test the effectiveness of alternative auditing 
procedures. 
3. Design and conduct staff training programs directed to understanding 
the business of specific industries and specific companies. The research 
might include follow-up tests of the effectiveness of such training. 
Summary and Conclusions 
1. Management fraud suggests three special characteristics— 
(1) The fraud is perpetrated at levels of management above those for 
which internal controls generally are designed. 
(2) It frequently involves using the financial statements to create an 
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illusion that an entity is more healthy and prosperous than it actually 
is. 
(3) If misappropriation of assets is involved, it frequently is shrouded in a 
maze of complex transactions often involving related third parties. 
2. I am less optimistic than is Mr . Ziegler that a G A A S audit will be sufficient 
defense with respect to undetected management fraud. I fear that public 
expectations already have overriden the profession's attempt to establish 
reasonable limits of responsibility. 
3. Internal controls generally are not designed to control higher levels of manage-
ment. Consideration should be given to whether controls can be redesigned to 
be more effectively imposed on higher levels of management. 
4. The four points in Mr . Ziegler's program comprise significant audit standards 
directed to management fraud. They surely contain the essence of the issues 
contained in the cases found on the public record. 
5. Because undetected management fraud impacts so severely on auditors, as-
pects of management fraud should be fruitful areas of research both for profes-
sional accountants and academics. 
Footnotes 
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